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Abstract: 
This paper deals with the problem of financing SMEs. The latter often find it difficult to raise funds and finance 
their activities. A modest contribution is to analyze the success factors of SME credit applications. An 
operation of 116 loan application files at the BIMAO level makes it possible to detect variables that can 
influence the financing decision. An econometric treatment based on a logistic regression leads to a model 
able to make predictions. Thus, we find that financial guarantees short-term financing requests and service 
activities facilitate a favorable financing decision. These variables have a positive and significant influence on 
the financing decision. 
Key Words: Financing; SME; BIMAO; Guarantees Duration Sector of Activities.  
 
1. Introduction 
The importance of SMEs in terms of job creation and economic development is recognized in both industrialized and 
developing countries. In Senegal as in other African countries SMEs form the bulk of the economic fabric by their 
diversity and their presence throughout the country. They constitute a fundamental element of economic and social 
development strategy (Wamba 2001) and are considered the main source of employment in certain regions (Tadesse, 
2009). In fact, SMEs contribute 25.8% and 25.4% respectively to turnover and added value in Senegal (SME Directorate, 
2014). These contributions are insufficient in view of their number (around 90% of companies) which should stimulate a 
good economic momentum if measures and support are undertaken. The importance that SMEs should have in the 
economy has favored the creation of structures (ADEPME, the management of SMEs the office of upgrade etc.) the 
adoption of the SME charter in 2003 followed by its transfer to law in 2008 the sectoral policy letter in 2010 the creation 
of financing instrument such as FONSIS (Sovereign Investment Fund), FONGIP (Guarantee Fund and priority 
investment), BNDE (National Bank of Economic Development) etc. Despite, their role in contributing to the economic 
dynamism of countries access to external financing is an important challenge for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(OECD, 2007; Collier, 2009; Van Pham, et al... 2009). Financial institutions are cited as the main sources of external 
funding aboratory for SMEs (St-Pierre, 2004). However, the financial sector experienced a severe crisis in the 1980s and 
has undergone extensive restructuring and liquidation of several banks and majority-owned financial institutions leaving 
a large gap in the supply of finance for SMEs. The financial sector has been liberalized and major innovations have 
enabled the creation of microfinance institutions and new banks to contain the demand for SME financing. With the 
evolution of the financial sector in recent years new financial intermediaries (decentralized financial systems or banks of 
microfinance institutions such as BIMAO) are trying to take over the needs of companies and are increasingly interested 
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in SMEs. However, they still struggle to raise funds from these funding structures (Chebil and Tadjine, 2010; Psillaki, 
1995) 
The difficulties that SMEs may have in accessing bank financing could be linked to a lack or insufficiency of information 
presented to financial institutions (Janssen and Wtterwulghe, 1998). This information deficit often results in a demand for 
financial guarantees that SMEs can not meet or a rationing of credit (rejection or limitation of amounts requested). SMEs 
are considered risky by financial institutions due to lack of information on entrepreneurs' repayment capacity and weak 
guarantees (Kuffmann, 2005). Also the growth attractiveness and performance of the business sector could explain the 
success of SME financing requests.  
Wanting to understand the reasons for the rejection or the acceptance of SME financing requests we are interested in the 
following question: what factors can improve the success or limit the obtaining of SME financing from BIMAO?  
This work is not meant to be exhaustive in the analysis of credit success factors not exhaustive in the analysis of the 
success factors of the credit granted but seeks a modest contribution of certain variables in the financing decision of 
SMEs. Thus, an analysis of 116 SME credit files at the BIMAO level makes it possible to list the following analysis 
variables: the amount of the credit demand the sector of activity the financial guarantees and the duration of the loan; and 
to improve the understanding of financing decisions for the needs of SMEs. To better understand the issue we present a 
review of the literature on the explanatory variables of financing the specificities of Senegalese SMEs the methodology 
based essentially on a logistic regression and the analysis of the results. 
2. Review of the Literature on the Success Factors of the Credit Application 
Theoretical analysis of this problematic consists in working on the objective factors that contribute to the decision 
making of SME financing by the BIMAO. These factors will enable SME leaders to properly prepare and edit their credit 
application files. The analysis of the success factors of financing SMEs depends on the nature of bank or funding 
institution. One often oppose the "bank commitment" giving a preponderant value to the personality of the individual 
(human qualities motivations of the customer to "the bank act" which bases es its decisions on objective variables like the 
plan of financing, contributions or guarantees ... (Chebil and Tadjine, 2010).  
These banks refer to two types of "soft"and "hard" information respectively. The "soft" information is considered as a 
qualitative data which is reduced to the judgments and opinions of the person who collected it. It is usually collected and 
used by one person only. This person is supposed to be in direct contact with the SME. It collects this type of information 
throughout the period of the relationship established with the enterprise and it generally represents the credit officer 
responsible for monitoring the evolution of this relationship; therefore, this collection is done at the lowest hierarchical 
levels of the bank. Hard information is a quantitative data; it presents neither a judgment nor an opinion nor an 
interpretation of the agent who collects it. This person loses all decision-making power and discretion during his 
treatment: he becomes a simple reporter (Stein, 2002). In fact, this information is impersonal it opposes the other type of 
information and is based on relatively objective criteria such as ratios and profitability indices. This information must 
have a unique interpretation by all agents at all hierarchical levels of the bank. Referring to the objective factors and to 
the bank in action (Lefilleur, 2008) points out that a context marked by a strong asymmetry of information constitutes a 
barrier to access to finance by SMEs. 
The asymmetry of information refers to the disparity between information available to credit-seeking firms and fund 
providers that are usually assumed to be informational disadvantages. The traditional channels of communication are 
often deficient because the entrepreneurs diffuse erroneous financial information in order to escape the taxation or the 
banks do not control the payment behaviors of the new customers (lack of history). (Lehman and Neuberger, 2002) state 
that asymetry of information exists more at the level of SMEs in developing countries or that property rights poorly 
protected lead entrepreneurs to keep their information confidential. These situations expose banks to the risk of adverse 
selection or moral hazard. Banks anticipate risk coverage by requiring real guarantees from SMEs or working with 
guarantee funds (public or private) to cover outstanding payments. The existence of a material or financial guarantee 
plays a large role in the granting of credit (Berger and Udell 1995 Bester 1994 Ngongang 2015). However, in some areas 
such as Central Africa fund-based financing experiments failed because the provision of a guarantee was a vector for 
lower repayment rates and poor investment project choices (Kuffmann, 2005). The personal guarantees asked of the 
leaders constitute a rationing instrument frequently used especially for the structures that have just been created (Baroin 
and Fracheboud 1983). The market position of firms is also a key variable in financing decisions for financial institutions 
(Levratto, 1990). The sector of activity of the project is a determining factor in the survival of the projects (Zidani and 
Jarboui 2011). Thus, industrial firms except those belonging to the meat and dairy products sector are more profitable 
than service firms particularly for business services and transport (Vassile, 1982). This profitability is decisive in 
obtaining credit. Indeed "The profitability of SME borrowers is also an important criterion for lenders the realization of a 
high turnover to minimize the risk of bankruptcy and thus increase the chances of repayent » (Levratto, 1990, p207).  
Analyzing the financial structure of SMEs, there is a higher proportion of debt compared to other sources of financing 
and moreover a preponderance of financial debts in the short term (Levratto, 1990). This suggests that financial 
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structures prefer short-term credit which is naturally less risky over time. The success of much of the decentralized 
financial systems (DFS) is due to the short-term nature of the credits granted. These short maturities make it possible to 
detect payment difficulties very early and initiate recovery procedures (Zidani and Jarboui 2011). Also DFIs are finding 
it increasingly difficult to grant long-term loans because they can not refinance with the central bank and have limited or 
no access to the financial market for the most part. They only recycle in the short term the savings collected mostly on 
sight. This review of certain explanatory variables makes it possible to propose a model which is not exhaustive but 
which reflects certain levers to be targeted in order to facilitate the obtaining of SME credit from financing structures 
such as BIMAO. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Specificities of Senegalese SMEs  
National Law No. 2008-29 of 28 July 2008 defines SMEs as any physical or moral entity producing goods and / or 
market services whose distinctive criteria are based on: workforce annual turnover excluding taxes transparency in 
bookkeeping net investment. In these articles 3 and 4 small businesses are identified according to the following criteria 
and thresholds:  
-effective between one (01) and twenty (20) employees; 
- annual turnover excluding taxes not exceeding the limits provided to be taxable to the Single Global Contribution 
(GTC) set by the General Tax Code. 
Enterprises (ME) are those that meet the following criteria and thresholds:  
- employees between twenty-one (21) and two hundred and fifty (250) employees; 
- annual turnover excluding taxes between the upper limit of the article 3 above and 5 billions CFA francs. 
SMEs in Senegal are mostly informal and are made up of micro and very small businesses. They suffer from a lack of 
financial technical and integration support in multilateral trade due to a lack of competitiveness. Added to these obstacles 
are the beginnings of a free trade swaping customs (Economic Partnership Agreements) making SMEs vulnerable to the 
onslaught of better prepared and often subsidized European companies. 
They are strongly characterized by a very modest size a concentration in Dakar and a small capitalization necessitating 
external financing whose access modalities pose a serious problem. Faced with these difficulties hindering the 
development of SMEs relevant levels of intervention are identified and we find among other things an unavoidable 
financing component which is the subject of a strategic axis of the 2010 sectoral policy letter. The summary review of the 
literature accompanied by a presentation of the profile of SMEs in Senegal made it possible to make a theoretical state of 
the place on the variables chosen in the analysis of the financing decision of Senegalese SMEs. This part is confronted 
with an empirical part requiring a specific methodology of treatment of information collected and an analysis of the 
results. 
4. Methodology  
The methodology adopted is based on the following points: the source the nature of the data collected the method of 
collection used and the method of treatment chosen. To obtain the information needed to deal with the problem it was 
important first to discuss the year 2017 with a credit officer of BIMAO. This allowed the exploitation of credit 
application files submitted to this structure. Careful long-term work led to a batch of 116 files filed by SMEs to find 
Exogenous variables   
- Credit amount (Mpi) 
- Financial guarantee 
(guarantee) 
- branch of activity (Sector) 
-Duration 
Financing 
Decision  
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funding resources. The analysis of these files one by one reveals recurring variables that have attracted the attention of 
the evaluators of credit application files. Thus, the amount of credit required the sector of activity the financial guarantees 
and the duration of the loan were targeted and retained in order to see their influence on the financing decision of the 
BIMAO. These variables are mobilized on 116 files in order to establish a database. This reasoning leading to this mass 
of information can be assimilated to a reasoned type of sampling. For a better treatment of the information of the base a 
coding is done on each variable. 
Table 1: Coding of Endogenous and Explanatory Variables Retained 
Variables Nature variable Codage 
Acceptance of the financing Qualitative 1 = yes ; If Not 
Credit amount (Mpi) Digital Value Presented in Credit Files 
Financial Gurantee Digital Value Presented in Credit Files 
Branch of activities Qualitative First, 1 = btp et 0 If not 
Same thing for trade and service 
Duration Qualitative 1 = Cterm ; 0 If not 
The treatments reserved for the collected data are of two natures: a logistic regression based on a logit / probit model and 
an estimate of the percentage of prediction and the marginal effects. The first estimate incorporating all the explanatory 
variables indicates the existence of a multicolinearite between the guarantee and the amount of credit demand. A 
correlation test gives a coefficient of about 0.70 (appendix 1) confirming the multicolinearite (even if it is not perfect). 
And therefore it is more rigorous to opt for two regression processes that separate the « guarantee »; and « demand credit 
amount »; variables separately. 
5. Results and Discussion 
 Following the detected multicolinearity the regression process including exogenous variables (log credit duration and 
active sector) leads to a globally insignificant model with (Prob>chi2) of 0.1107, >0.2020 and 0.1745 (Annex 2). Thus, 
these variables grouped in this model do not explain the credit financing decision for the benefit of SMEs. However the 
second regression process incorporating as exogenous variables (the log guarantee the duration and the sector of activity) 
leads to globally significant models (3) with respective R2 pseudonyms of 0.4285 0,441 and 0.4211 (Appendix 3). We 
can say that on average 42% of credit granting fluctuations are explained by the variables (guarantee credit duration and 
sectors of activity). For the first regression (Appendix 3) the p-value (P>| z |) and the assigned coefficients underline that 
the guarantee (in logarithm) and the duration have a significant positive influence. Here we have short-term code in 1 the 
coefficient being positive; this means that short-term files are more likely to have a favorable opinion on the decision. 
Similarly credit files with a large financial guarantee amount are more likely to be accepted for funding. But the sector of 
activities « BTP »; has no influence on the financing decision because the « p-value »; is greater than 5%. With the 
second regression in appendix 3 (taking into account the second coding modality of the sector of activities) the results on 
the guarantee and the duration are confirmed but we note that the commercial activities influence negatively the decision 
of financing. The more trade-related the credit application files the greater the rejection propensity. The negative 
coefficient means that the trade sector has a downward influence on the likelihood of being awarded and those in the 
other sectors are more likely to receive funding. The third regression (Annex 3) to integrate service activities in place of 
« construction » ; and « Trade » ; also confirms the results on the guarantee on the duration and shows that the services 
positively influence the decision of financing.  A credit application file for service activities has an upward impact on the 
likelihood of credit being granted. 
In summary, 42 of SME financing decisions by the BIMAO are explained by the guarantee the short duration of the 
object of financing and the activities of services. The larger the guarantees the shorter the credit period and the more 
service-oriented the records have a high likelihood of acceptance. In addition, the analysis of the coefficients of each of 
these variables shows that the short duration of the projects (coef: 3.15) influences the funding decision more than the 
other variables.  
However, BTP activities have no significant influence and the beginning influences negatively. The reasons for the 
rejection of trade finance can be well explained by interviews with the BIMAO agents and this requires a different but 
complementary data collection approach to that used in this work. 
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The coefficient of determination (Pseudo R2) does not reach 50% and it confirms the objective of contributing to the 
explanatory factors of the financing decision announced in the introduction. It is so important to point out that the 
weakness of (Pseudo R2) is a characteristic of micro-economic data. However, to convince on the robustness of the 
model with the variables of positive and significant influence (guarantee short duration and service) we estimate the 
percentage of prediction and the marginal effects. Appendix 4 allows us to say that the scoring model incorporating the 
variables (guarantee short duration and service activities) is robust because it has a prediction capacity of 90.52%. And 
therefore out of 98 accepted files the model manages to predict 90 and out of 18 rejected files the model has predicted 15. 
The ROC curve confirms the robustness of the model and the propensity of prediction.  
Figure 2: Curve of ROC 
 
The rock curve gives a value close to 1 indicating an acceptable discriminating value. Therefore, we can say that the 
model can be used as a basis for a scoring. Taking into account the marginal effects makes it possible to see in what 
proportion will be the probability of acceptance of the files if the amount of the guarantees varies. Annex 5 gives the 
sensitivity (eg elasticity) of the financing decision in relation to exogenous variables. For example we see here that an 
increase in the guarantee of 1% results in an increase in the probability of granting the credit of 18%; all things being 
equal. 
6. Conclusion  
The analysis of the context shows a contribution of SMEs to the creation of turnover and the added value up to 25% on 
average. SMEs are also dynamic in creating jobs. The importance of SMEs in the economic fabric led to the creation of 
ADEPME the SME Directorate the Office of Upgrade the adoption of the SME Charter and the sectoral policy letter. 
Added to this, the creation of financing instruments such as FONSIS (Sovereign Investment Fund) FONGIP (Guarantee 
Fund and Priority Investment Fund) BNDE (National Bank for Economic Development) to meet the needs of financing 
of project promoters and SMEs. This financing component constitutes a real constraint for the development of SMEs. 
Certain elements required by the bank or certain characteristics related to the activity of the SME constitute blockages for 
the financing. Faced with this problematic an analysis of 116 SME loan application files made it possible to make a 
modest contribution of certain variables to the financing decision.  
A logistic regression on the variables of the credit files makes it possible to note those which influence significantly and 
positively the decision of financing. Thus, we arrive at a robust model capable of making good predictions from the « 
guarantee »; « short-term »; variables of the projects to be financed and; « service activities ». The credit applications that 
are more likely to be accepted are those with a high financial guarantee a short duration and active services. The duration 
variable influences more than the other variables because it is affected by a higher coefficient. However, the results show 
that the activities of « BTP »; do not have significant influence. Thus, a funding file referring to such activities can be 
funded or rejected. Trade activities have a negative influence on the financing decision. The more a credit file relates to 
such an activity the less likely it is to be accepted.  
In terms of involvement SMEs must foresee short-term less risky projects and have a financial resource as a guarantee to 
limit the credit rationing they suffer. Service SMEs can take advantage of their situation and the sector in which they 
operate to raise funds and finance their activities. In the absence of meeting these requirements they must be supported if 
there is a state policy to make them viable and sustainable. Bank-backed guarantee funds or instruments such as FONSIS 
FONGIP or BNDE could be very useful in supporting the raising of funds and the improvement of assets in terms of 
revenue generation value-added and employees. This work presents a limit on the limit number of exogenous variables 
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and the consideration of other variables (gender managerial experience age of the SME) could be very useful and 
reinforce the quality of the model. 
Annexes 
Annexe 1 :  
. pwcorr lmpi lguarantee 
                 lmpi lgaran~e 
-------------+------------------ 
        lmpi |   1.0000  
   lguarantee |   0.6885   1.0000 
Annexe 2: 
Regression 1: 
Logistic regression                            
Number of obs   =        116 
Wald chi2 (3)    =       6.02 
     Prob > chi2     =     0.1107 
Log pseudolikelihood = -54.618556                     Pseudo R2       =     0.0545 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
 Acceptance |      Coef.   Std. Err.      Z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lmpi |   -.525045   .3221528    -1.63   0.103    -1.156453    .1063629 
       cterm |  -.0306709   .6677275    -0.05   0.963    -1.339393    1.278051 
         btp |   .5776089   .8000563     0.72   0.470    -.9904727     2.14569 
       _cons |   10.58401   6.049292     1.75   0.080    -1.272385    22.44041 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
we see that the model is not globally significant (Prob > chi2=0.1107) 
Regression 2: 
Logistic regression                                  Number of obs   =        116 
                                                                 Wald chi2 (3)    =       4.62 
                                                                   Prob > chi2     =     0.2020 
Log pseudolikelihood = -54.861716         Pseudo R2       =     0.0503 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
             |               Robust 
 Acceptance |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lmpi |  -.5260739   .3233159    -1.63   0.104    -1.159762    .1076137 
       cterm |  -.0012554    .664542    -0.00   0.998    -1.303734    1.301223 
    Trade | -.1418801   .5005545    -0.28   0.777    -1.122949    .8391887 
       _cons |   10.73898   6.036791     1.78   0.075    -1.092911    22.57087 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
                       Journal of Research in Business, Economics and Management (JRBEM)                                                                                                                                                                      
ISSN: 2395-2210 
Volume 11, Issue 3 available at  www.scitecresearch.com/journals/index.php/jrbem                                               2175 
 
Idem, le modèle n’est pas globalement significatif (si je prends commerce comme ref) 
Regression 3: 
 
Logistic regression                                    Number of obs   =        116 
                                                                   Wald chi2 (3)    =       4.96 
                                                                      Prob > chi2     =     0.1745 
Log pseudolikelihood = -54.803487                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0513 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
             |               Robust 
 Acceptance |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lmpi | -.5521046   .3152189    -1.75   0.080    -1.169922     .065713 
       cterm |  -.1187053   .6829517    -0.17   0.862    -1.457266    1.219855 
    Services | -.2989122   .7311556    -0.41   0.683    -1.731951    1.134126 
       _cons |   11.23708   5.914091     1.90   0.057    -.3543236    22.82849 
Idem when one takes service as reference (model is not globally significant) 
Annexe 3:  
Regression 1 
Logistic regression                                      Number of obs   =        116 
                                                                       LR chi2 (3)      =      49.51 
                                                                        Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -33.012975                         Pseudo R2       =     0.4285 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 Acceptance |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lguarantee |   2.145578   .4625524     4.64   0.000     1.238992    3.052164 
       cterm | -  3.037103   .9344468     3.25   0.001     1.205621    4.868585 
          btp | -  1.478463   1.044817     1.42   0.157    -.5693406    3.526267 
       _cons | -36.30496   8.049935    -4.51   0.000    -52.08254   -20.52737 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Régression 2 
Logistic regression                                       Number of obs   =        116 
                                                                 Wald chi2 (3)    =      14.31 
                                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0025 
Log pseudolikelihood = -32.291882                 Pseudo R2       =     0.4410 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
             |               Robust 
 Acceptance |      Coef.   Std. Err.      Z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lgarantie |   2.262213   .6398641     3.54   0.000     1.008102    3.516323 
   cterm  |   3.267311   1.013137     3.22   0.001     1.281599    5.25302 
  Trate        | -1.370906   .6775061    -2.02   0.043    -2.698794   -.0430189 
    Cons | -37.31593   10.67071    -3.50   0.000    -58.23015   -16.40172 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Regression 3 
 
Logistic regression                                        Number of obs   =        116 
                                                                       Wald chi2 (3)    =      14.56 
                                                                          Prob > chi2     =     0.0022 
Log pseudolikelihood = -33.443797                Pseudo R2       =     0.4211 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
             |               Robust 
 Acceptance |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lgarantie |   2.187148   .6024762     3.63   0.000     1.006316     3.36798 
       cterm |   3.156265   .9713805     3.25   0.001     1.252394    5.060136 
    Services |   1.368513   .6842037     2.00   0.045      .027498    2.709527 
       _cons | -36.99795   10.24245    -3.61   0.000    -57.07277   -16.92313 
Annexe 4 : Pourcentage de prédiction vraie 
Logistic model for acceptation 
              -------- True -------- 
Classified |         D            ~D |      Total 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
       +     |        90             8 |         98 
       -      |         3            15 |         18 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
   Total   |        93            23 |        116 
 
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5 
True D defined as acceptance! = 0 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   96.77% 
 
 
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)   65.22% 
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Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   91.84% 
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   83.33% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)   34.78% 
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)    3.23% 
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)    8.16% 
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)   16.67% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Correctly classified                        90.52% 
Annexe 5 : Effets marginaux 
Marginal effects after logit 
      y = Pr(acceptation) (predict) 
         = .90665846 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
lgaran~e |   .1850959      .04279    4.33   0.000   .101225  .268967   16.7815 
   cterm*|   .4787294      .16326    2.93   0.003   .158746  .798712       .75 
Services*|   .0807299      .03681    2.19   0.028   .008578 .152881   .146552 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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